Abstract. Self-reference has played a prominent role in the development of metamathematics in the past century, starting with Gödel's first incompleteness theorem. Given the nature of this and other results in the area, the informal understanding of self-reference in arithmetic has sufficed so far. Recently, however, it has been argued that for other related issues in metamathematics and philosophical logic a precise notion of self-reference and, more generally, reference is actually required. These notions have been so far elusive and are surrounded by an aura of scepticism that has kept most philosophers away. In this paper I suggest we shouldn't give up all hope. First, I introduce the reader to these issues. Second, I discuss the conditions a good notion of reference in arithmetic must satisfy. Accordingly, I then introduce adequate notions of reference for the language of first-order arithmetic, which I show to be fruitful for addressing the aforementioned issues in metamathematics. §1. To prove his famous first incompleteness result for arithmetic, Gödel [5] developed a technique called "arithmetization" or "gödelization". It consists in codifying the expressions of the language of arithmetic with numbers so that the language can 'talk' about its own formulae. Then, he constructed a sentence in the language that he described as stating its own unprovability in a system satisfying certain conditions 1 and showed this sentence to be undecidable in the system. His method led to enormous progress in metamathematics and computer science and also in philosophical logic and other areas of philosophy where formal methods became popular. Let's take a closer look.
§1. To prove his famous first incompleteness result for arithmetic, Gödel [5] developed a technique called "arithmetization" or "gödelization". It consists in codifying the expressions of the language of arithmetic with numbers so that the language can 'talk' about its own formulae. Then, he constructed a sentence in the language that he described as stating its own unprovability in a system satisfying certain conditions 1 and showed this sentence to be undecidable in the system. His method led to enormous progress in metamathematics and computer science and also in philosophical logic and other areas of philosophy where formal methods became popular. Let's take a closer look.
Let L be the language of first-order Peano arithmetic (PA). L contains =, ¬, ∧, ∨, →, ∀, and ∃ as logical constants, 0 as the only individual constant, S as a monadic function symbol, + and × as dyadic function symbols, and a stock of extra function symbols for recursive functions to be specified. All other logical and non-logical symbols are taken to be the usual abbreviations. We assume that PA contains definitions for each extra function symbol. N is the standard model for L , with ω as its domain. L is the main formal language we will work with in this paper. Unless otherwise indicated, all symbols and formulae we use or mention belong to L .
The individual term consisting of n occurrences of S followed by 0 is called the "numeral" of n. We denote it by n. If σ is a string of symbols, #σ is its code or Gödel number and σ the numeral of its code. To avoid certain difficulties nonstandard codings can lead to (cf. Heck [12] , Halbach and Visser [10, 11] ), I assume a fixed effective and monotonic coding. By "effective" I mean that given a number n there is an algorithm to determine which expression it codifies and, vice versa, given an expression σ there is an algorithm that delivers the code of σ . By "monotonic" I imply that if σ is a subexpression of σ , then #σ ≤ #σ . For perspicuity, when there's no room for confusion I will talk about expressions of L when what is really meant is their codes under our fixed coding.
Let Bew(x) be a formula defining and weakly representing provability in PA in PA: 2 for any sentence ϕ, Bew( ϕ ) is provable in PA iff ϕ is a theorem as well. Gödel showed there is a sentence γ of L such that the following equivalence is a theorem of PA:
γ , known nowadays as PA's "Gödel sentence", was characterized by Gödel himself in the following terms: 3 "We thus have a sentence before us that states its own unprovability." Carnap [2] generalized Gödel's construction to any formula with one free variable and proved what today is known as the "diagonalization" or "diagonal lemma". 4 This result can be obtained already in Robinson arithmetic, Q-i.e., PA without induction, plus the axiom ∀x(x = 0 → ∃y(x = Sy)). For all recursive functions are strongly representable in Q.
THEOREM 1.1 (Diagonalization). For every formula ϕ(x) there is a sentence ψ such that the following equivalence is a theorem of Q: ψ ↔ ϕ( ψ ).
(A)
Proof. Let Diag(x, y) strongly represent the primitive recursive (p.r.) function "diagonalization" that takes the code x of a formula ϕ (x) and returns the code y of ∀x(x = ϕ → ϕ) in Q.
∀x(x = ∀y(Diag(x, y) → ϕ(y)) → ∀y(Diag(x, y) → ϕ(y)))
is the result of applying the diagonalization function to ∀y(Diag(x, y) → ϕ(y)). Notice that (B) is the ψ we were looking for. Let n be the Gödel code of (B). By the laws of identity, (B) is logically equivalent to ∀y(Diag( ∀y(Diag(x, y) → ϕ(y)) , y) → ϕ(y)), (2) which is equivalent in Q to ϕ(n). Thus,
Q ∀x(x = ∀y(Diag(x, y) → ϕ(y)) → ∀y(Diag(x, y) → ϕ(y))) ↔ ϕ(n).
The main purpose of this paper is, nonetheless, to provide a sound and precise definition of reference or aboutness just for the language of first-order arithmetic. Other languages or extensions of L with new primitive predicate symbols such as the truth predicate are the subject of further work (cf. [author] ). The resulting notion will help us define salient reference patterns like self-reference, non-well-foundedness, loops, etc. Furthermore, it will give the intuitively right verdict on diagonal sentences obtained via diagonalization and will overcome the difficulties of the naïve notion and other previous attempts to define reference and self-reference for formal languages. As a consequence, the notions I introduce will prove themselves useful to properly formulate the metamathematical problems that Halbach and Visser mention. They will also serve as a blue print for future work on underlying reference patterns of sentences in languages with a truth predicate. This notion, in turn, could help us give a definite answer to the questions whether the Visser-Yablo paradox involves some kind of self-reference and whether all semantic paradoxes do so as well.
This paper is organized as follows. I first present the examples of Halbach and Visser and explain why the naïve understanding of what it means for a sentence to say of itself that it has a certain property cannot account for them. In §3 I list some desiderata for every notion of reference and, therefore, self-reference for the language of arithmetic. §4 gives new definitions of reference, self-reference, and well-foundedness, evaluates their pros and cons, and proves several results that show the notions are adequate from a material point of view. Finally, I indicate how the new notions could be used to provide exact formulations of the examples given by Halbach and Visser. §2. In this section I show that certain problems in metamathematics require a more fine-grain view on self-reference than the naïve conception introduced in the previous section, even to be properly formulated. Both examples are taken from the studies of Halbach and Visser [10, 11] . The first one is the question over the provability, refutability, or undecidability of 'Henkin' sentences formulated with Rosser's provability predicate. The second example is the question over the status of truth tellers.
Gödel has shown that under normal circumstances a sentence asserting its own unprovability in PA is undecidable in this system. So one might also wonder about a sentence that states its own provability instead. Is it provable, refutable, or undecidable? This question is usually known as "Henkin's problem", and sentences asserting their own provability are known nowadays as "Henkin sentences". In Henkin's [13, p. 160] 
own words:
If is any standard formal system adequate for recursive number theory, a formula (having a certain integer q as its Gödel number) can be constructed which expresses the proposition that the formula with Gödel number q is provable in . Is this formula provable or independent in ? I take to be PA. Let Bew(x) be as before. According to the naïve view of selfreference, a Henkin sentence would be any sentence η satisfying the equivalence η ↔ Bew( η ).
Note however that, by the weak representability requirement, any theorem of PA satisfies this equivalence. For instance, since 0 = 0 is a theorem, Bew( 0 = 0 ) is so too and, therefore, 0 = 0 ↔ Bew( 0 = 0 ) is provable as well. Thus, this 'Henkin sentence' is decidable and provable. Henkin was most likely very much aware of this fact and didn't consider it as an answer to his question. As Smoryński [28, p. 114 ] puts it, "Henkin did not want to know if some sentence accidentally equivalent to the assertion of its own provability was provable"; he did not mean to inquire about just any fixed point of the provability predicate. In a very clear sense, 0 = 0 doesn't say of itself that it is provable. It is neither self-referential nor a Henkin sentence.
Nonetheless, in [21] Löb put forward a solution to Henkin's problem that shows that no matter what fixed point of the form (3) we consider, η will always be provable. This is the renowned Löb's theorem. THEOREM 2.1 (Löb) . Let ϕ, ψ be sentences and Bew(x) satisfy Löb's derivability conditions in PA, that is,
Let Bew(x) in (3) satisfy Löb's derivability conditions. If we can prove (3) in PA for any sentence η, we have a fortiori that PA Bew( η ) → η and, by Löb's result, that η is a theorem of PA. As a consequence, even if a more sophisticated view on self-reference is needed to do justice to Henkin's formulation of his problem, the answer can be perfectly given without such notion, if (3) is provable in PA and Bew(x) satisfies Löb's derivability conditions.
But what if (3) were true in N yet unprovable in PA? Certainly what matters here is not the provability of a fixed point in this or that system but that the equivalence between η and Bew( η ) actually holds. In that case it would seem η is intuitively self-referential. Moreover, Henkin's formulation of the problem doesn't exclude this possibility. If a highly complex mechanism for self-reference is used, Löb's theorem wouldn't be able to give an answer to Henkin's question. 6 Löb's derivability conditions seem to be natural principles for provability, and so they are often considered as meaning postulates. In fact, the first one is one direction of weak representability, which can be seen as another criterion for the expressibility of provability (and other notions), due to Kreisel [18] . However, other provability predicates in the latter sense-that is, those that weakly represent provability in PA-that do not satisfy Löb's conditions have also played a role in the literature. One important case is Rosser's.
Let Prf(x, y) represent the recursive relation between a sequence of sentences x and a sentence y such that x constitutes a proof of y in PA in a natural way (cf. Halbach and Visser [10] ). The standard provability predicate is usually defined in L as ∃yPrf(y, x). This predicate satisfies Löb's derivability conditions. Rosser-provability, on the other hand, is defined as follows:
where ¬ . is a function symbol of L representing the recursive function that maps sentences into their negations. Intuitively, a sentence ϕ is Rosser-provable if there is a proof of it in 6 For instance, one could define an alternative diagonalization procedure based on an alternative diagonalization function defined by Diag (x, y) , that maps sentences ϕ to ∀x(x = ϕ ∧ γ → ϕ), where γ is PA's Gödel sentence, as before. Diag (x, y) is satisfied exactly by the same ordered pairs of natural numbers than Diag(x, y) in the standard model. But while the latter predicate strongly represents the function it defines, the former doesn't even weakly represent its corresponding function.
PA and there is no proof of ¬ϕ with a smaller code. Bew R (x) does not satisfy Löb's conditions for, as Halbach and Visser [11, obs. 7 .1] point out, it has both provable and refutable fixed points. For instance, both 0 = 0 and 0 = 0 are fixed points of Bew R (x) . Thus, unlike the case for standard provability, if there was a sentence that truly asserted its own Rosser-provability, there would be no trivial answer to the question over its status. Note that, as long as Löb's conditions constitute meaning postulates for provability, these 'Henkin' sentences formulated in terms of Rosser's provability predicate do not really say of themselves that they are provable, but something else. They are not Henkin sentences in the original sense. Call them "Henkin-Rosser" sentences. One might feel inclined to believe that the naïve view on self-reference is the only kind of view on self-reference we can have in arithmetic, as Cook [3] seems to suggest. Since "the notion of stating one's own provability in the original question cannot be eliminated by the notion of being a fixed point" (Halbach and Visser [10, p. 672] ), the question about the status of Henkin-Rosser sentences would be ill-posed. There would not be such thing as a sentence that asserts its own Rosser-provability. On the other hand, one can think, with Henkin, that a better understanding of self-reference for the language of arithmetic is possible, a notion that would make sense of Henkin's problem for Rosser's provability predicate. What Henkin probably had in mind was a sentence that is obtained by a procedure like the one we followed in the proof of Theorem 1.1, but certainly not just that particular one. In this paper I show that a better notion of self-reference for the language of arithmetic is in fact possible. If this notion rather than the naïve one is employed, one can actually make sense of the idea of a Henkin-Rosser sentence, and the question about the status of these expressions becomes a sensible one to be asked.
I now turn to the status of truth tellers in arithmetic. A truth teller is a sentence that states its own truth. Although arithmetic cannot contain its own truth predicate on pain of triviality, as Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of truth shows (cf. Tarski [30] ), it does contain partial truth predicates for sentences with limited quantifier complexity.
Formulae in L can be classified according to their quantifier complexity into sets n and n as follows. If ϕ is logically equivalent to a formula where all quantifiers are bounded, ϕ is both 0 and 0 . If ϕ is logically equivalent to a formula consisting of a block of universal quantifiers (possibly of length 1) followed by a n -expression, then ϕ ∈ n+1 . And if ϕ is logically equivalent to the negation of a n -formula, then ϕ ∈ n . Note that the sets in the hierarchies n and n are cumulative, for it's always possible to add superfluous quantifiers in front of a formula.
For every n, L contains predicates T n (x) and T n (x) defining the sets of n and n true sentences. 7 Moreover, we can choose T n (x) for n = 1 and T n (x) such that they belong to n and n , respectively. This means that the sentences that say of themselves that they are n -(n = 1) and n -true, however they are obtained, are themselves n and n , respectively. Thus, we have n -and n -truth tellers in the language. In most cases partial truth predicates cannot weakly represent the set of corresponding truths, for this set is often too complex. Besides defining their corresponding sets of n -and n -truthin-N, the reason why they are called "truth predicates" is that they satisfy the relevant meaning postulates, namely, the T-schema (the equivalence between a sentence and its 7 See, Kaye [16] or Hájek and Pudlák [7] for details on how to obtain partial truth predicates in PA. I follow Kaye for the most part, except I allow sets n and n in the truth definitions to be closed under logical equivalence, so every formula in L belongs to some set in the hierarchy. This implies that, unlike all other partial truth predicates, T 1 (x) is not in 1 but only in 2 .
truth ascription) in PA, PA T n ( ϕ ) ↔ ϕ for each sentence ϕ ∈ n and PA T n ( ϕ ) ↔ ϕ for each sentence ϕ ∈ n . As a consequence, each truth predicate has both provable and refutable fixed points. For instance, 0 = 0 and 0 = 0 are fixed points of every partial truth predicate. In some cases, the predicates can also have undecidable fixed points, like T 1 (x) has γ , PA's Gödel sentence. Therefore, the answer to the question whether n -and n -truth tellers are provable, refutable, or undecidable doesn't make sense if we turn to the naïve view on self-reference. Every sentence in n ( n ) would say of itself that it is n -( n -)true according to this view. The question over the status of truth tellers in PA requires a more precise definition of what it means for a sentence to say of itself that it has a determinate property, a proper understanding of self-reference that improves on the naïve one.
Setting aside the issues in metamathematics, there are also philosophical reasons why it would be good to have a better notion of self-reference for the language of arithmetic. Formal theories of truth are often formulated in an extension of L with a truth predicate. As Tarski shows, if instances of the T-schema for certain sentences containing this truth predicate are provable in a system, the system turns out to be unsound. Such sentences are considered paradoxical. The goal of most classical truth-theorists is to identify these sentences, so to exclude their corresponding instances of the T-schema from their theories. 8 Until recently the idea that every paradoxical expression involves some (relevant) kind of self-reference was widely accepted. If true, self-referentiality could be used as a restriction on instances of the T-schema, to avoid triviality.
The Visser-Yablo paradox challenged this view. Roughly, it consists of an infinite list of sentences, each of which says of all the ones coming later on the list that they are untrue. From the assumption that any of these sentences gets a classical truth value, a contradiction can be informally obtained. 9 This antinomy gave rise to a lively debate that evidenced the lack of proper notions of reference and self-reference for the language of arithmetic and its extensions, as Leitgeb [19] pointed out. 10 Without these notions, neither the referential status of sentences in the Visser-Yablo paradox nor the thesis that all paradoxes are selfreferential can be adequately assessed. This represents an obstacle to the development of formal (classical) truth systems.
In this paper I focus only on notions of reference and self-reference for L . They will help us, for instance, giving proper formulations of the metamathematical problems introduced in this section, that is, the questions about the status of Henkin-Rosser sentences and of n -and n -truth tellers. However, the new definitions will also serve as blueprints for defining similar concepts for the language expanded with a truth predicate. I hope the new notions can shed some light on the reference and self-reference of expressions in natural language as well. §3. Every sensible notion of self-reference should be definable in terms of a notion of reference as follows: a sentence is self-referential if and only if it refers to itself. Otherwise it wouldn't be clear why it is self-reference what we are talking about. For instance, if according to the naïve concept of self-reference a sentence ϕ self-refers in case it's provably equivalent to another sentence χ( ϕ ) that mentions ϕ, that is because the following notion of 'naïve' reference is operating in the background: sentence ϕ refers to sentence ψ in case there's a sentence of the form χ( ψ ) ϕ is provably equivalent to (which is not very plausible, since whether a sentence refers to a given object has nothing to do with provable equivalents of that sentence). Therefore, to arrive at a successful definition of self-reference the most natural way to go is to devise a good notion of reference first. The purpose of this section is to evaluate what conditions such a notion should satisfy and to understand what kind of concept we are after. §4 will provide a precise definition of reference and other kin notions, in accordance with the results obtained in this section.
To begin with, note that the concept of reference we are after is a relation between sentences. It isn't a relation between terms and objects, or sentences and truth values, as reference has been traditionally understood. It neither relates sentences to numbers. One of the main goals of this paper is to obtain a precise definition of self-reference. Thus, even though the language of arithmetic was originally designed to talk about numbers, and so we can take numbers to be its primary objects, I will focus on the sentences these numbers codify instead. If, for other purposes, the reader is interested in reference to numbers, it shouldn't be hard to obtain a definition of this closely related concept by performing straightforward modifications on the definitions of reference I provide in the next section.
A word of caution is needed about reference to sentences via their codes. The choice of coding, even effective and monotonic ones, is always arbitrary to some extent. As a consequence, what sentences an expression refers to is also very often an arbitrary matter. If we change the coding at play, most sentences will refer to different expressions. Thus, it only makes sense to talk about reference as a relation between sentences once a particular coding has been fixed, as I have done here.
Hopefully, it's now clear that the naïve notion of self-reference must be abandoned. Diagonal sentences, that is, sentences of the form
whether provable in PA or just true in N, should not be enough to conclude that ψ is selfreferential, on pain of triviality. As stated in §1, for every sentence ψ there is a predicate ϕ such that (A) is provable in Q. A fortiori, the provable material equivalence
cannot suffice to infer that ϕ refers to ψ. To conclude this, additional or perhaps just other conditions should be met. Good notions of reference and self-reference must have certain intensional aspects, as Halbach and Visser [10, 11] maintain. According to Leitgeb this is problematic. From his point of view, if diagonal sentences are not enough for self-reference, [. . . ] no philosopher may any longer argue in the following way: "By Gödel's diagonalization lemma, we know that there is a sentence ϕ such that ϕ is equivalent to '¬T ( ϕ )' in arithmetic. Thus there is a selfreferential sentence, that is, ϕ." (Leitgeb [19, p. 9 
])
In other words, we wouldn't be able to capture the paradigmatic cases of self-reference the diagonal lemma delivers. However, this remains to be seen. Given a formula ϕ (x) , the diagonal lemma does not deliver just any sentence ψ satisfying (A), but one of a special kind. It is possible that, due to the particular features ψ exhibits, the conditions a sentence should meet to truly refer to another sentence allow us to infer that ψ is self-referential.
The question is what these conditions are. Milne [22, p. 212 ] shares this concern:
Provable material equivalence in a theory is not normally a criterion of synonymy so we must suppose that it is something particular to Gödel biconditionals that is at issue. For a number of reasons the case is hard to make.
In this section I make this case, that is, I specify the conditions a good notion of reference for L should satisfy and show how, if these conditions were met, diagonal sentences that are obtained via diagonalization turn out to be self-referential. For the most part I follow Leitgeb [19] . He as well considers several desiderata for a notion of reference for formal languages. However, he arrives at a pessimistic conclusion, for his desiderata are mutually incompatible. Later in this section I argue against one of them, the so-called "equivalence condition". In the next section I show that the remaining conditions are simultaneously satisfiable and, therefore, compatible with each other.
As Leitgeb points out, a sentence can refer to an object-in our case another sentence-in two different ways. On the one hand, it can mention this object, that is, contain a term that denotes the object. On the other hand, the sentence can quantify over that object. 11 According to the first way in which sentences could refer, (C1): a sentence ϕ refers to a sentence ψ in case a term denoting the code of ψ occurs in ϕ.
I call this kind of reference "reference by mention", or "m-reference" for short. It is more demanding than the naïve view on reference: for ϕ to refer to ψ it's not merely required that ϕ is (provably) equivalent to a sentence of the form χ( ψ ), but it should be identical to χ( ψ ). If ϕ simply is χ( ψ ), then (4) follows trivially, for it's just an instance of the tautological schema δ ↔ δ. However, (C1) is just a sufficient condition for reference; it doesn't exclude other ways in which sentences might refer to other sentences. We can use (C1) to give a sufficient condition on self-reference, along the following lines:
This kind of self-reference, which I call "self-reference by mention" or "m-self-reference" for short, is certainly possible if L contains a term d . (x) defining the p.r. function d called "strong diagonalization", 12 which I assume it does. The result is known as the "strong diagonalization lemma" or "strong diagonal lemma". Given a formula ϕ with x free, d returns the formula that results from replacing x in ϕ with ϕ . Since Q contains definitions for each function symbol in L other than S, +, and
. . , v n , a (possibly empty) sequence of individual variables. THEOREM 3.1 (Strong diagonalization). For every formula ϕ (x, v) , where x is different from each v 1 , . . . , v n , there is a term t such that Q t = ϕ(t, v) . 13 Proof. We can prove in
For each ϕ (x, v) , the identity statement t = ϕ(t, v) delivered by the strong diagonal lemma is often called a "strong diagonal sentence", and ϕ(t, v), standing on the right-hand side, is often called a "strong fixed point" of ϕ, as opposed to the 'weak' diagonal sentences (equivalences of the form (A)) and the 'weak' fixed points 'weak' diagonalization (Theorem 1.1) delivers. Since identities are stronger requirements than equivalences, (C2) is more demanding than the naïve understanding of self-reference. For instance, (C2) does not allow us to conclude that 0 = 0 is self-referential, despite the fact that 0 = 0 is equivalent to Bew( 0 = 0 ) in PA, for 0 = 0 does not contain a term denoting itself (because under monotonic codings, 0 isn't the code of a sentence). Thus, we cannot conclude it's a true Henkin sentence.
Note that if a different coding had been chosen, the strong diagonal lemma would still hold, except that the terms it delivers would be different ones. If we vary the code of ϕ (x, v) , then the numeral ϕ(x, v) of its code varies along. As a consequence d . ( ϕ (x, v) ) will be a different term. Thus, whether or not a sentence is self-referential also depends on the particular coding that is being used and not only on the structure of the sentence. Since we are working with a fixed (effective and monotonic) but arbitrary coding, it is often the case that we cannot pin down the exact expressions a sentence refers to or the exact terms that occur in it. However, we are often in a position to make true structural claims about the reference patterns of formulae, as in Theorem 3.1. Actually, most of the claims about reference in this paper are of this sort.
(C2) is at the base of what Henkin and Kreisel seemed to have in mind in their paper exchange on the status of Henkin sentences: a sentence ϕ(t) says of itself that it has the property expressed by ϕ(x) if and only if t is a closed term denoting ϕ(t) (cf. Henkin [13, 14] and Kreisel [18] ). Thus, Halbach and Visser [10] call it the "Kreisel-Henkin criterion for self-reference". It can be seen as a more demanding version of the naïve understanding of what it means for a sentence to say of itself that it has the property expressed by ϕ (x) .
Despite its intuitive charm, (C1) could be seen as an over-generating condition on reference. Consider, for instance, the sentence Bew( ϕ ). It m-refers to ϕ, for the numeral ϕ (= n = S . . . S0) occurs in it. But it also m-refers to every sentence whose code is smaller than ϕ's (whatever those are) because the numerals m (with m < n) of these codes are all subterms of ϕ . This is a byproduct of not having an individual constant in the language to name each number in ω or, what amounts to the same, each expression of L . Furthermore, if x occurs free in Bew(x) (recall Bew(x) is a complex formula) in the context of the open term t (x) at least once, then Bew( ϕ ) would also refer to the sentence denoted by t ( ϕ ), if any. Of course, which sentences these numerals and subterms refer to depends entirely on the coding. Under two different codings, sentence like Bew( ϕ ) will 'over-generate' in different ways.
Unfortunately, this 'over-generation' is unavoidable. Discriminating between terms that play a role in reference and those that don't can lead to worse situations. For instance, to avoid that Bew( ϕ ) m-refers to every sentence whose code is smaller than ϕ's, one could suggest we shouldn't look into numerals, but only consider terms in sentences that aren't proper subterms of numerals. But what if x in Bew(x) only occurs in the context of the function symbol S? In that case, we wouldn't be allowed to conclude that Bew( ϕ ) refers to ϕ but only to the sentence codified by the successor of the code of ϕ, if such sentence exists. An analogous case can be made if other subterms were ignored for determining m-reference. If x occurs free in Bew(x) in the context of t (x) , to avoid that Bew( ϕ ) m-refers to the sentence denoted by t ( ϕ ), if any, one could require that only numerals are considered for m-reference. But in that case, we wouldn't be able to account for the selfreferential character of sentences delivered by strong diagonalization, such as the 'strong' Gödel sentence of PA, ¬Bew(g), given by
The term g the strong diagonal lemma provides is of the form
Moreover, it's not clear we want to ignore terms like t ( ϕ ) or m, with m < #ϕ in every sentence of the form ψ( ϕ ) whatsoever. For instance, if we ignore the term ¬ . ϕ in Bew(¬ . ϕ ) and only let ϕ to contribute to the reference of this sentence, we would not be able to say that Bew(¬ . ϕ ) refers to ¬ϕ, even though it intuitively says that ¬ϕ is provable. ψ( ϕ ) can be seen as saying of ϕ that it has the property expressed by ψ; or of the sentence denoted by t ( ϕ ) that it has the property expressed by ψ (x) [x/t (x) ], the result of replacing all occurrences of t (x) in ψ(x) with x; or of the sentence denoted by, e.g., ϕ − 1, that it has the property expressed by ψ(Sx). Each formula of L is as legitimate as any other. A similar phenomenon occurs in natural language. For instance, the sentence "The earth's circumference is smaller than Saturn's" not only refers to the earth's circumference but also to the earth; e.g., this sentence could be seen as part an answer to the question which planets have circumferences smaller than Saturn's.
Heck [12] regards m-self-reference to be 'true' self-reference, as opposed to the mere presence of equivalences of the form (A) and also to other prima facie possible ways of achieving self-reference. If he's right, m-reference is the only legitimate kind of reference, and (C1) and (C2) are not just sufficient but also necessary conditions for reference and self-reference, respectively. As a consequence, Heck's view is susceptible to Leitgeb's criticisms, since he cannot account for the self-referential character of sentences obtained via the weak diagonal lemma. In the equivalences of the form (A) the diagonal lemma delivers, ψ doesn't m-self-refer; it doesn't contain a term that denotes ψ but is only equivalent to a sentence (i.e., ϕ( ψ )) that contains such term. But these are part of the paradigmatic cases we wish to account for. As Leitgeb points out, we want to make sense of the usual claim that Gödel sentences are self-referential. This issue is also pressing in the case of semantic paradoxes. If T is a truth predicate, the (weak) diagonalization lemma applied to the formula ¬T x delivers what is called a "liar" sentence. 14 Together with certain naïve truth principles a paradox can be derived from it. If the diagonal lemma didn't deliver self-referential expressions, then we would have a non-self-referential semantic paradox on the cheap.
Contra Heck, I suggest we don't limit 'true' reference to m-reference. Indeed, reference can also be achieved using quantifiers. For instance,
says that all 1 -truths are theorems of PA; it intuitively refers to all 1 -truths. Similarly,
says some 2 -truths are not theorems of PA; so it intuitively refers to 2 -truths. ∀xBew(x), instead, seems to refer to everything, for it states that everything is provable in PA. More generally, (C3): sentences of the form
refer to all sentences satisfying ϕ, and (C4): sentences of the form ∀xϕ (x) , where ϕ is neither a conditional expression nor is equivalent to a conditional expression in a sense to be specified (although Bew(x) might be), refer to all sentences.
I call this kind of reference "reference by quantification" or "q-reference" for short. It is what Heck calls "reference by description". Unlike him, I do not consider it a second-class kind of reference. As in the case of m-reference, subterms should not be ignored. Sentences such as
seem to refer not only to ϕ but also to ¬ϕ, for they say of the latter that it is provable. In a similar fashion, nested quantifiers also play a role in reference. For instance,
and
appear to be asserting of ¬0 = 0 that is provable and so referring to this sentence as well as to 0 = 0. In general, (C5): sentences of the form (C) or (D) refer, in addition to the ϕs, to whatever ψ(n) refers to, provided that n satisfies ϕ (x) .
This condition covers the intuitions regarding q-reference behind the last two examples. It appears to be sound to say that reference is closed under logical connectives, that is, (C6): a sentence and its negation refer to the same expressions; the conjunction of two sentences refers to every sentence any conjunct refers to; etc.
This holds trivially of m-reference. In the case of q-reference, it implies, for instance, that
q-refers to the the same sentences as (C) does, and
(C3)-(C6) cover formulae of many different forms. Nonetheless, we haven't considered all cases. What sentences do expressions such as
where x→ . y represents the function that maps formulae x and y to the conditional from x to y? There seems to be no straightforward way to precisely define q-reference. Rather arbitrary decisions will have to be made to give a complete definition. I will come back to this in the next section.
We can see now how sentences resulting from an application of (weak) diagonalization intuitively q-refer to themselves, so the desired condition can be met: (C7): sentences resulting from an application of (weak) diagonalization are selfreferential.
Recall the sentence ψ diagonalization delivers is actually of the form
Although (B) does not satisfy its own antecedent, ∀y(Diag(x, y) → ϕ(y)) does. Furthermore, the sentence that results from replacing the free variable x in (B)'s consequent, ∀y(Diag(x, y) → ϕ(y)), with ∀y(Diag(x, y) → ϕ(y)) , i.e.,
q-refers to (B), for (B) satisfies the antecedent, Diag( ∀y(Diag(x, y) → ϕ(y)) , y). Therefore, (B), or in other words, ψ, q-refers to itself, by conditions (C3) and (C5). Analogously, these conditions guarantee that ψ is also self-referential when obtained by the existential proof of the diagonal lemma. For in that case ψ is of the form
so it refers to whatever
refers to, i.e., to the diagonalization of ∃y(Diag ∃ (x, y) ∧ ϕ(y)) or, what is the same, to itself. In both cases, ψ's self-referential character is not a consequence of it being equivalent to ϕ( ψ ), but of it somehow quantifying over itself. Dropping the naïve view on selfreference does not prevent us from classifying sentences delivered by (weak) diagonalization-e.g., Gödel sentences like γ in (1)-as self-referential, contrary to what Leitgeb suggests.
Leitgeb also notices that reference simpliciter cannot be defined as the disjunction of mand q-reference. This is just a direct form of reference. In some occasions it also makes sense to talk about indirect reference in the language of arithmetic. Let g 1 , g 2 be terms such that we can prove in Q that
Bew(g 2 ) says of ¬Bew(g 1 ) that it's provable in PA, while the latter says of the former that it is unprovable. These sentences form a reference cycle. If Bew(g 2
Cycles are perfectly possible in the language of arithmetic. Making small adjustments to the strong diagonal lemma, and provided the language contains the relevant function symbols, it is easy to prove the existence of cycles of any length in Q. Let n . (x) ∈ L represent in Q the p.r. function "numeral" that maps a number x to the code of its numeral, and let s . 
. . .
Proof. I prove it just for n = 2. We can show in Q that
) .
Thus,
This proof can be extended to cycles of any length in a recursive way as follows: If for an n-cycle for ϕ 1 (x), . . . , ϕ n (x) we start by strongly diagonalizing ϕ(x) (e.g., for cycles of length 2 we strongly diagonalize ϕ 2 (s . ( ϕ 1 (d . (x) ) , n . (x)))), and for an n + 1-cycle for 
Moreover, we can prove the existence of ω-sequences of sentences, each of which m-refers to the expression coming next. PROPOSITION 3.3 (ω-chains). For every formula ϕ (x) there is an infinite sequence of distinct terms t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t n , . . . such that, for every n ∈ ω,
Proof. Applying the strong diagonalization lemma to ϕ(s . (x, n . (Sy) )) we obtain a term t such that
Thus, applying s . (x, n . (y)) to both sides of the equation, we can prove in Q that
For each n ∈ ω, let t n := s . (t, n . (n)). It follows from (6) that
Moreover, we can show that not only each term in the sequence is distinct from the others but also that they denote different sentences, as follows:
(for the coding is injective) which means that n = m.
Thus, for instance, we can have an ω-chain of Henkin sentences, that is,
As in the case of standard Henkin sentences, if a member of this chain is provable, and thus true, then all the ones coming after it in the chain are true and provable as well; while if a sentence is unprovable and thus false, so are the following ones. This invites the thought that each sentence in the sequence refers, albeit indirectly, to all the ones that come after and not only to the one that follows immediately.
Furthermore, if a truth predicate were available in the language, turning to Proposition 3.2 we could formulate cycles of liars, from which we could derive a paradox pretty much in the same way we do with the standard liar sentence. If sentences in the cycle weren't indirectly self-referential, we would get non-self-referential semantic paradoxes on the cheap, as before. I take all this to show that, although sometimes it might not be necessary or adequate to go beyond direct reference, (C8): reference simpliciter is a transitive relation.
The last condition Leitgeb imposes on reference is the equivalence condition:
(EC): logically (not merely arithmetically) equivalent sentences refer to the same things. 15 He gives the following supporting argument:
(EC) is plausible because logically equivalent sentences are not only extensionally equivalent in the actual world, but indeed in every logically possible world, and thus indistinguishable in terms of the semantics of first-order predicate logic. If self-reference is to be defined by extending the usual reference relation for terms, i.e., a semantical relation, it is certainly strange if (EC) is invalidated. If (EC) is not true, the selfreferentiality or circularity of a sentence does not only depend on what the sentence says, but also in which way its content is being expressed.
This argument consists of two premises: (i) that semantic notions of first-order logic cannot distinguish between logically equivalent sentences and (ii) that (self-)reference is a semantic relation. The question we need to ask is what is meant here by "semantic". If "semantic" means a predicate of sentences that is definable purely in terms of models or possible worlds, such as "being a logical truth", then premise (i) is true, but premise (ii) is false. According to the previous conditions Leitgeb himself suggested for reference, a definition of this concept will inevitably mention the syntactic components of the referring sentences. Indeed, the self-referentiality of a sentence does depend on the way its content is being expressed. 16 On the other hand, if "semantic" is to designate also definitions that mention concepts other than models or possible worlds, then premise (i) fails to be true because we can certainly distinguish between logically equivalent sentences such as 0 = 0 and ∀x(ϕ(x) → ϕ(x)) attending to their syntactic structure. Leitgeb's argument fails to support (EC) as a condition a notion of reference should satisfy.
Moreover, as Leitgeb himself notices, (EC) is incompatible with some of the other conditions for reference that have been discussed in this section. On pain of trivializing reference, if the equivalence condition held we would have to drop (C1). Given any two sentences ϕ and ψ, there is always a sentence that is logically equivalent to ϕ and mentions ψ, e.g., ϕ ∧ ψ = ψ . Thus, (C1) would imply that every sentence refers to every other 15 Actually, this is not Leitgeb's original formulation. His reads: "if A is self-referential/circular, and if B is logically equivalent to A, then also B is self-referential/circular." (Leitgeb [19, p. 10] ) However, as Urbaniak [32] points out, this condition is far stronger and less convincing. Let t = Bew(t) and consider its logical equivalent ∀x(x = t → Bew(x)). While it might be intuitively appealing to assert that Bew(t) and ∀x(x = t → Bew(x)) refer to the same things, is far less clear that we want to commit ourselves to the idea that ∀x(x = t → Bew(x)) is self-referential just because Bew(t) is. Intuitively, ∀x(x = t → Bew(x)) refers to Bew(t), but not to itself. Given that the weaker version of the equivalence condition I suggest is already problematic, I stick to it. Moreover, Leitgeb's arguments support my version of the equivalence condition rather than his own. 16 In [20] Leitgeb changes his mind: he acknowledges this fact and rejects (EC).
sentence. For similar reasons, (C3) should be dropped in the presence of (EC): (C) is logically equivalent to
whose antecedent is true of every sentence in the language.
If one still finds (EC) to be an appealing condition, a way of resolving the conflict with the other conditions could prima facie consist in imposing restrictions on which terms and predicates can be sources of reference, as has been done by Putnam [25] , Goodman [6] , and Urbaniak [32] . According to these accounts of reference or aboutness sentences refer more or less as expected, as long as the relevant terms or predicates occur informatively. Roughly, a sentence of the form ϕ(t) is about the object t denotes only if ϕ(t) doesn't logically imply ϕ(s) for every other term s. In the same fashion, sentences of the form ∀x(ϕ(x) → ψ (x) ) are about the ϕs (or the class of ϕs) just in case they don't logically imply ∀x(χ (x) → ψ(x)) for every other formula χ(x) (or ϕ is a logical predicate). Thus, if the equivalence condition was at play, for instance, ϕ and ϕ ∧ ψ = ψ would refer to the same sentences, but the latter would not refer to ψ, for ψ does not occur informatively in ϕ ∧ ψ = ψ . In this way, triviality can be avoided.
However, other counterintuitive cases and incompatibilities emerge. Most saliently, the very idea of informativity prevents the identification of strong diagonalization as a mechanism for self-reference. If we strongly diagonalize the (logical) predicate x = x, we obtain a term t such that t = t = t . Since t = t logically implies s = s for every term s, t = t isn't about itself and, therefore, isn't self-referential. An analogous claim can be made about weak diagonalization.
I conclude that the equivalence condition is not a reasonable requirement we should impose on reference. Thus, it appears we can still hope to find an adequate notion of reference in L , contrary to what Leitgeb [20] seems to suggest. As Smoryński [28] and Halbach and Visser [10, 11] indicate, the fruitless attempts to make these conditions work together, the resistance of reference to be treated as an extensional concept, could be what lead mathematicians and philosophers away from the formal study of reference and selfreference in arithmetic.
Indeed, rejecting (EC) implies reference should not only be intensional but also hyperintensional in the following sense: 17 (C9): some logically equivalent sentences fail to refer to the same objects.
In particular, pairs of logically equivalent sentences of the form ϕ and ϕ ∧ t = t, or ∀x(ϕ(x) → ψ(x)) and ∀x((χ (x) → χ(x)) → (ϕ(x) → ψ(x))), do not necessarily refer to the same things. There are other cases of logically equivalent schemata, however, for which we feel inclined to believe they do refer to the same objects. Take for instance ∀x(¬ϕ(x) → ψ(x)) and ∀x(¬ψ(x) → ϕ(x)). Unlike the previous examples, these just seem to be two different ways of expressing exactly the same (trivial or nontrivial) content about the same objects. A similar point can be made concerning ∀x(ϕ(x) → ψ(x)) and ∀x(¬ψ(x) → ¬ϕ(x)), ∀x(ϕ(x) → ψ(x)) and ∀x¬¬(ϕ(x) → ψ(x)), ∃x(ϕ(x) ∧ ψ(x)) and ∃x(ψ(x) ∧ ϕ(x)), ∀x∀yϕ and ∀y∀xϕ, ∀xϕ(x) and ∀yϕ(y), and other transformations of the like.
Thus, in an ideal situation, instead of rejecting the equivalence condition altogether, we keep the good bits without trivializing our definition of reference. How can we identify the good bits? (EC) trivializes m-and q-reference because, for instance, we can always add t = t as a conjunct to every formula and obtain a logically equivalent expression, or relativize every conditional to a logical truth like ϕ(x) → ϕ (x) . Unlike the examples I gave at the end of last paragraph, these logical equivalents add irrelevant compounds to sentences. Thus, an idea would be to adopt a version of (EC) restricted to logical transformations that do not add new atomic formulae but, roughly, just distribute them in a different way. According to this restricted version of (EC), (C10): reference is closed, not under classical logic, but under some kind of relevant consequence relation.
In this sense we could say the notion of reference we are after is not absolutely hyperintensional but lies somewhere between intensionality and hyperintensionality. I have examined the conditions that should hold of a good notion of reference that could help us to properly formulate certain problems in metamathematics, like the ones introduced in §2. These are conditions (C1)-(C10). The resulting notion could serve as a blueprint for a concept of reference applicable to the study of semantic paradoxes and, perhaps, even natural language. I've argued that reference should hold between sentences (via their codes, in a particular fixed coding) and do justice to the intuitions behind reference by mention and by quantification and the possible transitivity of reference. Moreover, it should be hyperintensional but, at the same time, closed under a weaker consequence relation than (classical) logical consequence. In the next section I show such concept is possible by setting an example and proving the pertaining results. §4. In order to give a precise definition of reference I first need to introduce three main preliminary notions: m-reference, q-reference, and direct reference. Then, a definition of reference simpliciter is given, and several results on this notion that establish its adequacy are stated and proved. Finally, I define self-reference and well-foundedness in terms of reference. I show that the diagonalization procedures used in the proofs of Theorems 1.1 and 3.1 and Proposition 3.2 deliver self-referential sentences, whereas sentences in the ω-chains that Proposition 3.3 provides turn out to be non-well-founded (but unfortunately also self-referential).
It's important to highlight that the concepts of reference I put forward are of a semantic nature, for they depend on the standard interpretation N of the language. 18 For instance, when defining m-reference, I assume the denotation of terms that occur in sentences is given by N; 19 and in defining q-reference, when I say the code of a sentence satisfies the antecedent of ∀x(ϕ(x) → ψ(x)), I mean satisfaction in N. I believe this is the most natural way of understanding conditions (C1) and (C3) in the previous section. Moreover, it doesn't tie reference to a particular theory such as PA, which would lead to undesired results.
DEFINITION 4.1 (M-reference). If ϕ, ψ are sentences, then ϕ m-refers to ψ if and only if ϕ contains a closed term t such that N t = ψ .
I require that t is closed in ϕ to keep apart m-from q-reference, as we will see soon. Definition 4.1 clearly satisfies condition (C1). As a consequence, all sentences denoted by terms delivered by the strong diagonal lemma m-refer to themselves. If t is a closed term and t = ϕ(t) is provable in Q, then it's true in N, so ϕ(t) contains a closed term t that denotes ϕ(t). Sentences like t = t, where t = t = t , m-refer to themselves just like ¬Bew(g) in (5) does.
As expected, m-reference is closed under logical connectives. Also, it is naturally closed under the desired kind of relevant equivalence. Valid propositional transformations that do not add any new atoms do not alter m-reference. For instance, ϕ and ¬¬ϕ, ϕ → ψ and ¬ψ → ¬ϕ, ϕ∨ψ and ¬ϕ → ψ, and ¬(ϕ∧ψ) and ¬ϕ∨¬ψ m-refer to the same sentences, correspondingly. Moreover, we can swap quantifiers of the same kind and rename variables without affecting the sentences an expression m-refers to, since none of this changes the closed terms that occur in a formula.
On the other hand, defining reference by quantification in a way that also enjoys closure under this kind of relevant consequence relation turns out to be a much more complicated task. To begin with, I introduce the notion of a formula being in postnex disjunctive normal form (PDNF, cf. Definition 4.3) and describe a procedure that allows us to transform any given formula into an expression in this form, which I call "normalization" (cf. Definition 4.6). Roughly, a formula is in PDNF just in case all its subformulae are disjunctions of conjunctions of atomic, universal, negated atomic, or negated universal expressions, and the normalization of a formula is the result of applying successive transformations to it that preserve logical equivalence and do not add any new atoms, until the resulting formula is in PDNF. This is close to the notion of prenex disjunctive normal form and the algorithms to obtain such formulae that can be usually found in textbooks. 20 Then, a direct definition of the q-reference of sentences in PDNF will be given. The q-reference of other sentences will be defined as the q-reference of their corresponding normalizations (cf. Definition 4.9). This will guarantee that all sentences that have the same normalization, which are obviously logically equivalent, refer by quantification to the same things. Moreover, those sentences whose respective normalizations differ only in the order or association of their conjuncts and disjuncts, or in the renaming of the variables, will also q-refer to the same expressions. Thus, q-reference will be closed, not under classical logic but under the kind of relevant transformations mentioned at the end of last section.
To express every formula of the language as a disjunction of conjunctions of atomic, universal, negated atomic, or negated universal expressions, we first need to get rid of the logical connectives that cannot occur in such formulae, that is, → and ∃. In order to do so, we translate each formula of L into L ⊆ L , the language that results from removing from L all formulae containing → or ∃. We turn to the usual definitions of → and ∃ in terms of ¬ and ∨ resp. ¬ and ∀. Let τ : L → L be defined as follows:
if ϕ is of the form ∃vψ.
τ obviously preserves truth-in-a-model and provability-in-a-theory. 
DEFINITION 4.2 (Prime). A formula ϕ of L is a prime if and only if it is an atomic formula, the negation of an atomic formula, a universally quantified expression, or the negation of a universally quantified expression.

DEFINITION 4.3 (Postnex disjunctive normal form). A formula of L is in PDNF if
For instance,
is in PDNF, while
isn't because y is not free in x = Sx. In turn,
isn't in PDNF either, since the subformula ¬(¬∀yx = y ∧ x = Sx) is not a disjunction of conjunctions of primes. Next I introduce the notion of normalization, an algorithm for turning each formula ϕ of L into PDNF form. It consists on the step-by-step transformation of each subformula of ϕ according to the number of nested quantifiers that occur in the subformula. Thus, I first provide the following two definitions.
DEFINITION 4.4 (Depth). Let dep be an assignment of numbers to universally quantified formulae of L such that dep(∀vϕ)
Intuitively, the depth of ∀vϕ is the maximum length of chains of nested quantifiers occurring in the formula. Thus, each universal formula of L has finite depth.
DEFINITION 4.5 (i-normalization). The i-normalization [ϕ] i of a formula ϕ of L without superfluous quantifiers is the result of successively applying the following transformations to each subformula ∀vψ of ϕ of depth i:
The i-normalization of a formula turns all its subformulae of depth i into disjunctive normal form, except literals (i.e., atomic or negated atomic expressions) are replaced with primes. Unlike prenex normal forms, quantifiers are pushed inside rather than outside of disjunctions, just next to the disjuncts whose variables they can bind. Consider the formula
Its 1-normalization consists in applying transformations 1-4 in the above definition to its subformulae of the form ∀vϕ of depth 1, i.e., ∀z(z = 0 ∨ x = 0) and ∀z¬(z = z). This results in x = 0 ∨ ∀z(z = 0) and ∀z(z = z), resp. Thus, [ (7)] 1 is
On the other hand, [ (7)] 2 consists in transforming the universal subformulae of (7) of depth 2, so we just replace ∀y¬(∀z( 
max{dep(∀vψ)
: ∀vψ is a subformula of ϕ} is the maximum of the depths of the universal subformulae of ϕ. If ϕ doesn't contain quantifiers, let max{dep(∀vψ) : ∀vψ is a subformula of ϕ} = 0.
Going back to our previous example, [ (7) (7)] 2 ) is the result of replacing ∀y¬((
Finally, [[[(7)] 1 ] 2 ] 3 , that is, [ (7)], is the result of pushing ∀x inside in (9), as clause 4 of Definition 4.5 requires, for x is not free in ∀z(z = z):
It can be shown that every formula of L is logically equivalent to a PDNF formula. Moreover, normalization is an effective procedure to find this expression. For reasons of perspicuity, in what follows I will often talk of normalizations of formulae of L when what is really meant are normalizations of the translations of these formulae into L . PROPOSITION 4.7. Every formula ϕ ∈ L is logically equivalent to a formula in which all subformulae of the form ∀vψ are in PDNF, and normalization is an effective procedure to find one.
Proof. Note that clauses 1-4 of Definition 4.5 imply only a finite number of transformations. Thus, i-normalizations terminate in finitely many steps. Note as well that erasing superfluous quantifiers and performing the transformation steps in Definition 4.5 to a formula result in a logically equivalent expression.
Let ϕ − be the result of erasing all superfluous quantifiers in ϕ. We now show by induction on n that, for all n ≥ 1, in the formula that results from successively performing i-normalizations, from i = 1 to i = n to ϕ − (i.e., [. . .
, all universal subformulae of depth ≤ n are in PDNF. Since erasing superfluous quantifiers is a finite operation as well, we get the desired proof.
Let ∀vψ be any subformula of [ϕ − ] 1 of depth 1. By clause 4 of Definition 4.5, if ψ is of the form ψ 1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψ m , v is free in ψ i , for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Note that pushing the only quantifier inside a disjunction does not generate new formulae of the form χ ∧ (γ ∨ δ) and (γ ∨ δ) ∧ χ inside a subformula of depth 1. Then, by clause 3, no conjunctions of disjunctions can occur in ∀vψ. By clause 2 and the fact that pushing the quantifier inside a disjunction and distributing conjunctions over disjunctions doesn't create new double negations, there are also no double negations in ∀vψ. Finally, pushing the quantifier inside a disjunction, distributing conjunctions over disjunctions, and erasing double negations doesn't create new formulae of the form ¬(γ ∨ δ) or ¬(γ ∧ δ) inside a subformula of depth 1 if there originally weren't any. Thus, by clause 1, the latter don't occur either in ∀vψ. As a consequence, ∀vψ is in PDNF.
Assume 
Also, pushing the first quantifier of a sequence inside a disjunction in a subformula of arbitrary depth m does not generate new subformulae of the form χ ∧ (γ ∨ δ) and (γ ∨ δ) ∧ χ inside a subformula of depth m. Thus, by clause 3, no conjunctions of disjunctions can occur in ∀vψ. By clause 2 and the fact that pushing the first quantifier of a sequence inside a disjunction and distributing conjunctions over disjunctions doesn't create new double negations, there are also no double negations in ∀vψ. Finally, pushing the first quantifier of a sequence inside a disjunction, distributing conjunctions over disjunctions, and erasing double negations in a subformula of arbitrary depth m doesn't create new formulae of the form ¬(γ ∨ δ) or ¬(γ ∧ δ) inside a subformula of depth m, if there originally weren't any. Therefore, by clause 1, the latter don't occur either in ∀vψ. As a consequence, ∀vψ is in PDNF.
Actually, the normalization of a formula does not return an expression in PDNF, but just one in which all quantified subformulae are in PDNF. Although it won't be necessary in what follows, one can easily obtain a formula in PDNF by applying clauses 1-3 of Definition 4.5 to its normalization.
DEFINITION 4.8 (Permutations). The set of permutations of a formula ϕ ∈ L is the smallest set containing ϕ that is closed under commutativity and associativity of disjunction.
Although Leitgeb's equivalence condition should be rejected on pain of triviality, a restricted version of it is desirable, as stated in (C9) and (C10). My proposal here consists in just requiring that sentences whose normalizations have the same set of permutations-which are obviously logically equivalent-refer to the same objects. In other words, reference will be closed under permutations of disjunctive subformulae of normalizations. Note that translations, normalizations, and permutations do not disturb the atomic components of sentences, which seemed to be the problem with Leitgeb's equivalence condition, but just change connectives and redistribute quantifiers. Later in this section I show that the resulting definition of reference does not lead to triviality and, furthermore, it gives the right verdict in several intuitive cases. Let k abbreviate k 1 , . . . , k n . Since only quantified subsentences contribute to q-reference, sentences not containing quantifiers, such as ϕ → . ψ = ϕ → ψ , do not q-refer, as expected. Also, the fact that only normalizations are considered implies that superfluous quantifiers aren't a source of q-reference either, for formulae in PDNF cannot contain them. Thus, ∀x ϕ → . ψ = ϕ → ψ , for instance, does not q-refer to any sentence.
χ is of the form
Moreover, Definition 4.9 satisfies the conditions (C3)-(C5) stated in the previous section. The idea behind clauses 1 and 2(a) is that the only way of restricting the referential power a quantifier carries with it is via conditional expressions, that is, bounded quantification allows for restricted q-reference. Recall conditionals are translated into L as disjunctions. If a normalized sentence ϕ has a subsentence of the form ∀ vχ in which χ is not a disjunction, given the normalization process, it means χ cannot be a conditional, and reference by quantification is unrestricted. Thus, ∀ vχ refers to everything, and so does ϕ. As a consequence, condition (C4) is satisfied. For example,
, and
q-refer to every sentence because x = ¬ . x, ¬(x = y → x→ . y = y→ . x), and ¬∀y¬(y = ¬ . x → y = x→ . x) cannot be rewritten as conditionals since the normalizations of ∀x(x = ¬ . x), ∀x∀y¬(x = y → x→ . y = y→ . x), and ∀x¬∀y¬(y = ¬ . x → y = x→ . x) are ∀x(x = ¬ . x) resp. ∀x∀y(x = y ∧ x→ . y = y→ . x) and ∀x¬∀y(y = ¬ . x ∨ y = x→ . x). In the latter, ∀y cannot be pushed inside the disjunction, for y is free in both disjuncts. Also, the q-reference of sentences for the form
is now decided as follows: if ϕ(x) and ψ(x) are atomic, then (10) q-refers to all sentences. Otherwise, it depends on what the normalization of (10) is. If, on the other hand, ϕ contains a subsentence of the form ∀ vχ in which χ is of the form δ ∨ γ , we can read the latter as the conditional ¬δ → γ , which restricts the quantifiers ∀ v to the codes of sentences k ∈ ω satisfying ¬δ in N. Clause 2(a) guarantees that sentences of the form
and 
q-refer to sentences satisfying ϕ(x), fulfilling (C3). (C) translates into ∀x(¬τ
Furthermore, clause 2(b) in Definition 4.9 guarantees that (C5) holds, for it's there to help us deal with subterms and nested q-reference. Given that the normalizations of (C) and (D) are (11) resp. (12), clause 2(b) guarantees that (C) and (D) q-refer to whatever sentences ψ(n) m-(on condition that the term involved is a result instantiating x with n) or q-refers to, provided that N ϕ(n). For instance, it entails that
q-refer not only to 0 = 0 but also to its negation. Clause 2 also allows us to conclude that the sentences the weak diagonal lemma (Theorem 1.1), both in universal and in existential forms, delivers q-refer to themselves. Of course, this carries the same 'problems' that affect m-reference: ψ(n) refers not only to the sentence coded by n, if any, but also to every sentence denoted by a closed term occurring in ψ(n). In particular, this means that (C) and (D) q-refer to every sentence whose code is equal or smaller that n, for every n ∈ ω satisfying ϕ (x) in N. Of course, which sentences these are will depend entirely on the coding.
The requirements that terms are closed in Definition 4.1 and that closed terms are 'new' in Definition 4.9 are to keep m-and q-reference apart. If a closed term t denoting a sentence χ already occurs in ψ (x) , and no new occurrence of t is generated by replacing x in ψ (x) with n, where N ϕ(n), then it doesn't seem right to conclude that (C) q-refers to χ , but only that it m-refers to χ . For the occurrence of t in ψ(n) is not a product of instantiating the quantifier in (C) but was already there. For instance,
doesn't q-refer to ¬ϕ; it only m-refers to ¬ϕ. On the other hand, if an open term t (x) occurs in a sentence ϕ, it must do so in the scope of a quantifier ∀x (in the normalization of ϕ). In that case, the occurrence of a closed term t (n) denoting a sentence ψ is the result of instantiating ∀x, even if ∀x(t (x) = ψ ) is true in N. Thus, we say ϕ q-refers to ψ.
In addition, our definition of q-reference avoids the difficulties that Milne [22] pointed out. Let Th ⊆ L be an unsound theory (with respect to N) extending Q and χ a theorem of Th such that N χ . Then, Diag (x, y) := Diag(x, y) ∧ χ strongly represents the diagonalization relation in Th. However, as Milne notices, it doesn't seem right to claim that
refers to itself, for N Diag( ∀y(Diag (x, y) → ϕ(y)) , (13) ) ∧ χ , that is, (13) does not satisfy the antecedent of Diag ( ∀y (Diag (x, y) → ϕ(y) ) , y) → ϕ(y). This is precisely the reason why Definition 4.9 does not allow us to conclude that (13) q-refers to itself, despite the provability of the equivalence between this sentence and ϕ (13) in Th or other theories. To conclude so, a concept of reference relative to a theory rather than an absolute, semantic notion like the one introduced here would be needed. 22 It's also worth noting that q-reference is not a trivial notion. Although in many cases q-reference depends on how the formulae involved in the sentence really look like (and of course on the chosen coding), there are sentences of the form (C) that we can be sure do not q-refer to every sentence in the language. Take, for instance,
where ϕ is a sentence. This simple expression just q-refers to ϕ, ¬ϕ, every sentence whose code is smaller than ϕ's, and nothing else. Definition 4.9 also allows us to assess the q-reference of sentences of the form ∀ vϕ( v) and ∃ vϕ( v), where ϕ is preceded not just by one but by a string of quantifiers of arbitrary length. In that case, for instance, according to clause 2(a) sentences of the form
q-refer to every sentence that is an entry of an n-tuple satisfying ϕ (and ¬ψ). I opt for dismantling tuples satisfying the antecedent of sentences of this form to keep q-reference as a relation between sentences, instead of sentences on the one hand, and tuples of sentences on the other hand. This seems to be the most natural way of making sense of notions such as self-reference and well-foundedness that are introduced later in this section.
Like m-reference, q-reference is also closed under logical connectives. If ϕ q-refers to ψ, by Definition 4.9 ϕ must contain a subsentence of the form ∀ vχ satisfying clause 1 or 2. Then, so do ¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ δ, ϕ ∨ δ, and ϕ → δ, for any sentence δ of the language. This implies that ∀x(ϕ(x) → ψ (x) ) and ∃x(ϕ(x) ∧ ¬ψ(x)) q-refer to the same sentences, as can be reasonably expected, given that the latter translates into ¬∀x¬¬(ϕ(x) → ψ(x)), whose normalization is the negation of ∀x(ϕ(x) → ψ(x))'s.
Before I turn to general notions of reference and their derivatives, let me point out that the fact that we look into the set of permutations of the normalizations of sentences to assess q-reference entails that reference is closed under the translation τ , normalization and permutations of normalizations, as expected. This implies, for instance, that q-reference is closed under propositional transformations such as double negation, de Morgan laws, and the distributivity of conjunction over disjunction. It is easy to check that q-reference is also closed under the commutativity and associativity of conjunction, the renaming of variables, and the commutativity of quantifiers of the same kind. Thus, reference is the transitive closure of direct reference, that is, the union of m-and q-reference. Condition (C8) is satisfied. If one does not find the transitivity of reference intuitively appealing, one can stick to direct reference rather than reference simpliciter.
Since both m-and q-reference are closed under negation, conjunction, disjunction, and implication, so is direct reference and, therefore, also reference, as required by (C6). Also, sentences delivered by weak and strong diagonalization (directly) refer to themselves, for they q-and m-refer to themselves, respectively.
Finally, a word on hyperintensionality. Reference as given by Definition 4.12-and, a fortiori, direct reference as well-is not closed under first-order logical equivalence, that is, it is hyperintensional. For instance, if 0 is not the code of a sentence, 0 = 0 directly refers to no sentence, whereas 0 = 0 ∨ Bew( 0 = 0 ) refers to 0 = 0. Similarly,
refers to everything, but
Nonetheless, reference and direct reference are closed under many logical transformations, as required by condition (C10). This is a consequence of the closure of m-and q-reference under these transformations, which I pointed out before. The following proposition offers some examples: We are able to define now three prominent patters of reference. As expected, sentences delivered by the weak and the strong diagonal lemmata turn out to be directly self-referential according to Definition 4.14. Definition 4.15, on the other hand, can also account for the self-referential character of cycles of any length, such as the ones delivered by Proposition 3.2. Cycles given by pairs of sentences such as ϕ(t) and ∀x(ψ(x) → χ(x)), where t denotes ∀x(ψ(x) → χ (x) ) and ϕ(t) is a ψ, or ∀x(ϕ(x) → ψ (x) ) and ∀x(γ (x) → δ (x) ), where the former is a γ and the latter a ϕ, are self-referential as well. The notion of reference also allows us to define a form of well-foundedness. Obviously, all self-referential expressions are not well-founded. For given a chain of reference ϕ, ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n , ϕ, we can extend it indefinitely with the sequence ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n , ϕ, obtaining longer and longer chains of reference. Also, ω-chains delivered by Proposition 3.3 are not well-founded, for each sentence directly refers to the one coming next and indirectly to all the ones that come after itself. Unfortunately, given the way they are obtained, their members are self-referential as well, albeit only indirectly. Let's take another look at the proof of Proposition 3.3. Given a formula ϕ with exactly one free variable, each sentence on the list is of the form ϕ(s . (t, n . (Sn))), with n ∈ ω. Then, for
is also on the list. Since n < #ϕ(s . . (t, n . (Sn) )). Thus, by the transitivity of reference each sentence on the list is self-referential. §5. In the last section I introduced notions of reference by mention, by quantification, direct reference, reference, self-reference, and well-foundedness. Now it's time to see how to put them to use. In particular, they should enable us to provide reasonable formulations of the metamathematical problems singled out in §2. The notion of direct self-reference should allow us to determine which sentences say of themselves that they are Rosserprovable, n -true, and n -true, that is, we should be able to identify regular Henkin-Rosser sentences, n -truth tellers, and n -truth tellers (with n = 1). In order to do that we need to spell out what it means for a directly self-referential sentence to ascribe a certain property to itself. As Halbach and Visser [10] point out, this task is highly nontrivial. The main issue stems from the way properties are to be individuated. To determine whether a sentence of arithmetic ascribes to itself a property P we need to know what it takes for a formula ϕ(x) to express P. Another way of putting it is the following: What does it take for two formulae ϕ (x) and ψ(x) of L to express the same property? The answer to this question depends on how intensional we believe properties should be. Unlike sets, pluralities, or classes, properties are usually considered to be intensional entities of some kind. As a consequence, it wouldn't be enough that ϕ (x) and ψ (x) are equivalent in N, in PA, or in some other arithmetical theory for them to express the same property. Otherwise, Bew(x) and Bew R (x) as introduced in §2 would express the same property (provided that PA is ω-consistent). Clearly, a stronger notion of equivalence is required. On the other hand, we shouldn't go too far and claim that any syntactic difference in formulae implies a difference in the properties they express, for this is certainly too strong. For instance, it seems that ϕ(x) ∧ ψ(x) and ψ(x) ∧ ϕ(x) do express the same property, despite being different formulae.
I see at least two reasonable ways of understanding the equivalence between formulae expressing the same property: an intensional and a hyperintensional one. According to the former, logically equivalent formulae (with the same number of free variables) express the same property. This means, for instance, that ϕ(x) and ϕ(x) ∧ x = x express the same property. Consequently, every directly self-referential sentence ascribes to itself the property of being self-identical, as well as every other logical property expressed by a valid formula; as long as we accept that if ϕ ascribes property P to χ , then ϕ ∧ ψ also ascribes property P to χ .
If all of this seems undesirable, as Halbach and Visser suggest, one might alternatively consider allowing only minor syntactic variations in formulae, such as the ones involved in normalizations. In that case, expressing a property would be a hyperintensional relation, but closed under some sort of relevant notion of logical equivalence. Unfortunately, this also has counterintuitive consequences. For example, Bew(x) and Bew(x)∨Bew (x) would not express the same property. Perhaps there is a way of including this kind of transformations while excluding the undesirable ones, but I am so far sceptical about it. In any case, what it means for a formula of the language of arithmetic to express a property is beyond the scope of this paper. In this section I just provide two notions of self-ascription, each of which is based on one of the ways of understanding the equivalence between formulae expressing the same property considered in this section (cf. Definitions 5.1 and 5.2).
Setting this issue aside, there are several ways in which a sentence can ascribe the property P expressed by ϕ (x) to itself. Before we turn to our definitions, it's important to distinguish the way we are interested in from other ways. On the one hand, a sentence can ascribe P to itself and, at the same time, to others, or it can ascribe P just to itself. For instance, ∀x(Sent(x) → ¬Bew(x)) (15) says of all sentences in L that they are unprovable in PA, including (15) itself, whereas PA's Gödel sentence ¬Bew( γ ) ascribes the same property just to itself. On the other hand, a sentence can ascribe a single property to itself (and perhaps other sentences), or it can ascribe a property to itself (and perhaps other sentences) and, at the same time, ascribe other properties to other sentences. For example, the strong diagonal lemma delivers true identities t = t = t and s = s = s ∧ Bew( 0 = 0 ) . While t = t just ascribes self-identity to itself, s = s ∧ Bew( 0 = 0 ) ascribes self-identity to itself as well as provability to 0 = 0. It seems the notion we are most interested in is that of a sentence ascribing a single property just to itself. However, given the lack of individual constants for numbers other than 0 and predicate symbols for properties other than identity in L , it is frequently the case that one and the same sentence ascribes different properties to different sentences. Take, for example, Bew( ϕ ). It says of ϕ that is provable, but it also says something about each sentence whose code is smaller than ϕ. In the following two definitions of self-ascription we try to avoid this the best we can. sentence. Finally, note that the reason why we write δ in Definition 5.1 instead of ϕ is that δ could be different from ϕ but of the form ϕ(s (x) ) for some open term s (x) , and t = s(k) for all k ∈ ω satisfying the γ i . For example, let ¬ψ be logically equivalent to ∀x(x = t → Bew(¬ . x)), where t denotes ψ. ¬ψ ascribes to itself the property expressed by Bew(x) here, but it's Bew(¬ . x), the formula that acts as δ in Definition 5.1. the new notions to other languages, for instance, not containing individual constants or a standard interpretation-such as the language of set theory or the extension of L with a truth predicate, I hope they will shed light on investigations of reference for other formal and perhaps even natural languages. §6. Acknowledgments. I am deeply indebted to Volker Halbach, with whom I had countless fruitful discussions on reference and self-reference over the last five years. I would also like to particularly thank Thomas Schindler, for great suggestions and encouragement, especially when it came to proofs. I should mention as well Eduardo Barrio, Catrin Campbell-Moore, Roy T. Cook, Martin Fischer, Hannes Leitgeb, Øystein Linnebo, Johannes Stern, Albert Visser, the Buenos Aires Logic Group, the MCMP logic community, and the Oxford logic group. Finally, I am grateful to two anonymous referees for the sensible improvements they proposed.
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